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In the past few years there has been an explosion of interest in
aesthetics, marked recently by the publication of a four volume ency-
clopaedia of aesthetics by Oxford University Press. At the same time
there has been a narrowing of the subject in two of its most important
journals, the American Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism and, more
emphatically, the British Journal of Aesthetics. These are both now
clearly dominated by analytical aesthetics and the latter is, at times,
hardly concerned with aesthetics but more focussed on issues of ana-
lytical philosophy. In a recent website paper, its editor Peter Lamarque
argued:
Attention to the individual arts has the benefit of bringing
aesthetics closer to actual critical practice and encourages
links with subject specialists, in musicology, film studies,
literary theory, and art history. It also puts salutary con-
straints on the grand designs of aesthetics, particularly
attempts to develop overarching or all-embracing theories of
the arts. But there are dangers too. One danger is that aes-
thetics becomes more parochial, more culture bound. When
Anglophone philosophers talk about music or film or litera-
ture it is usually a pretty narrow band of works that are taken
as paradigmatic—inevitably these are the works that the
writers know, more often than not canonical works in the
western tradition. Generalisations about these works and their
properties are not always likely to carry over to works from
different cultural traditions. It would no doubt be wrong to
exaggerate concerns here because after all the western art
tradition is a vast and important one and if philosophers can
shed light on it some good is done. But the worry is that
aesthetics then loses that great aspiration of philosophy, how-
ever derided, to be universal and timeless. It does seem as if
universality goes hand in hand with abstractness. In other
words, the more abstract the subject matter the more uni-
versal are the findings likely to be; an analysis of truth or
meaning or ontology or symbolism or fictionality is inherently
less likely to be culture bound than discussions of impres-
sionist painting, avant garde film or the realist novel.1
Subjects like representation and the logic of fiction are, properly
speaking, philosophical and are only marginally concerned with
aesthetics. The original editor of the British Journal of Aesthetics, Harold
Osborne, warned that this would happen as long ago as 1977 in his
article ‘Aesthetic Relevance’.2 It seems to me that the time has come to
get back to basics and spell out the distinctiveness of the subject in its
relationship to the arts. Ironically, this is a case of history repeating
itself. At the beginning of the twentieth century a significant number of
academics felt that the aesthetics of the German idealists was getting so
remote from the artistic that they had to re-invent the subject ‘from
below’. In response to this situation, in 1906, Max Dessoir established a
journal to do just that, the Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunst-
wissenschaft 3 and, in 1913, he inaugurated international congresses on
aesthetics, which have continued through to the present day. In fact,
this Pacific Rim Congress is a product of that movement that draws the
study of aesthetics into alignment with the study of the arts. The
American and British societies were also a product of that movement
and the Sydney Society of Aesthetics and Literature echoes its aims.
The word ‘aesthetics’ has a number of meanings including, in Medi-
terranean countries, the work of beauticians. In our context ‘aesthetics’
has two significantly different meanings: an academic discipline and a
domain of experience.
As an academic discipline aesthetics has had a chequered history.4 It
was initiated by a circle of intellectuals associated through The Spectator
with Joseph Addison to explore the pleasures of the imagination and
judgements of taste. It became incorporated into a major philosophical
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system through the work of Immanuel Kant, drawing on earlier British
and German sources, and focussed primarily on beauty and sublimity
in nature and, again, on the judgement of taste. Through Hegel aes-
thetics became specifically associated with fine art and continues to be
so to the present day.
The domain of the aesthetic was both the beautiful, and sublime, as
attributed properties of nature, and then of art, and then the area of
experience subjected to judgements of taste. A typical English philoso-
pher of the 20s, W. T. Stace, following Benedetto Croce, declared that
beauty was an all-encapsulating concept including ‘the pathetic, the
comic, the sublime, the grotesque, the magnificent, the grand, the whim-
sical, the romantic, the idyllic, the realistic, the impressionistic, the
symbolic, the classical, the sad, the melancholy, the graceful, the
humorous, the majestic, the pretty, and so forth.’ 5 Stace declared Croce’s
great insight was that ‘all these supposed divisions and modifications of
the beautiful are arbitrary and not based on any scientific or philo-
sophical principle. No special aesthetic theory is needed for them.’ 6 I
doubt that any commentator on the arts would share that view today
and it hardly merits discussion, except within the context of the history
of the subject.
With the rise of analytical philosophy there has been a considerably
more rigorous analysis of aesthetic concepts, particularly in the work of
the late Frank Sibley whose collection of essays published posthu-
mously in Approach to Aesthetics is probably one of the most sophis-
ticated explorations of their logic available. He observed: ‘The objects to
which we apply aesthetic words are of the most diverse kinds and by no
means esoteric: people and buildings, flowers and gardens, vases and
furniture, as well as poems and music.’ 7 To this we can add paintings
and sculpture of course. His list of aesthetic terms includes: beautiful,
graceful, delicate, lovely, exquisite, elegant, dainty (connected with liking,
delight, affection, regard, estimation or choice); ugly (connected with
fear or revulsion); garish, splendid, gaudy (with what notably catches the
eye or attention); dainty, nice, pretty, exquisite (with what attracts by
noticeable rarity, precision, skill, ingenuity, elaboration); handsome
(suitability to ease of handling).8 The logic of such concepts is that they
may not be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.
Reasons can be given for their use, in terms of their objects’ features,
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but these are indicative and of no logical force except in a potentially
negative way: a straight line, or angular, cannot be graceful but you
cannot create a rule for a graceful curve. Aesthetic judgements are
judgements of taste and they are not confined to the world of high art.
Interestingly, Sibley argued that an engagement with the aesthetic
was universal and deeply rooted in human responses to the natural and
artefactual world around them. In his essay ‘Arts or the Aesthetic—
Which Comes First?’ 9 he argued that, conceptually, aesthetic expe-
rience takes priority over artistic activity. Without going into all the
nuances of his argument: it is a feeling for the aesthetic that leads
people into the production of artworks. Even the deliberate production
of anti-aesthetic artworks is parasitic upon the concept of the aesthetic.
If we recognise that Sibley’s broad points are correct, we also have to
recognise that he used distinctions drawn from a particular moment of
English linguistic usage and that Stace, again, used English words
drawn from Western European artistic traditions. While the phenome-
non of a feeling for the aesthetic may be universal, it may well be
articulated in different ways by different cultures at different times.
(And, just to be clear, this does not mean to say that there is an identifi-
able feeling that is a feeling for the aesthetic.) This is something best
explored by linguists, philologists and anthropologists, not by philoso-
phers, because it is a matter of empirical facts.
So I now get to the core of my argument. Human beings, across
cultures and through history, have responded to the natural and
artefactual world around them in a variety of ways articulated through
both language and behaviour. Some of it has been documented; a lot of
it has not. Ernst Gombrich has raised doubts about whether one is
entitled to infer these responses through works of art alone, labelling
the phenomenon ‘the physiognomic fallacy’.10 It is also an error to
believe that one can theorise about artistic activities without recognising
that at different times and places they have had different functions and
were frequently multi-functional. Both the ‘discipline’ of aesthetics and
the concept of fine art are modern and European. That does not mean
that the feeling for the aesthetic or the creation of works of art had to
wait for the emergence of modern Europe.
If we compare our situation to Dessoir’s, back in 1903, a number of
things become apparent, not least our knowledge and understanding of
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other cultures, which was high on his agenda, but also what he described
as ‘primitive art’. Chapter six of his book Ästhetik und allgemeine
Kunstwissenschaft 11 was titled ‘The Origin of Art and the System of the
Arts’ and its second section ‘The Art of Primitive Peoples and of
Prehistoric Times’.What we might forget is although prehistoric remains
were discovered in the cave of Chaffaud in 1834, no-one realised how
old they were. While the famous cave paintings of Altamira were
discovered in 1879, they were denounced as fakes and it wasn’t until
1902 that the famous French prehistorian Émile Cartailhac published his
Mea culpa d’un sceptique recognising both their authenticity and their age.
In the following year, 1903, Salomon Reinach published his famous
essay on art and magic in the journal L’anthropologie arguing that the only
way in which we can understand Upper Palaeolithic art was by way of
analogy with the products of so called ‘primitive’ peoples.With the recent
emergence of cognitive science, the subject has been re-examined,
resulting in Steven Mithen’s The Prehistory of the Mind: The Cognitive
Origins of Art and Science in 199712 and the publication of a special issue
of The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism in the spring of this year on
‘Art, Mind and Cognitive Science’. Luckily for my purposes, the authors
had ignored David Lewis-Williams’ exciting book The Mind in the Cave:
Consciousness and the Origins of Art, published in 2002.13
The great strength of Lewis-Williams’ argument is that it attempts
to account for all of what I would call the contingent features of cave
art. His starting point is that from a neurological point of view Homo
sapiens is the same whether he be cave-man, hunter-gatherer or 21st
century man. ‘Fully modern human consciousness, by contrast to that
of the Neanderthals’ he argues, ‘includes the ability to entertain mental
images, to generate mental images in various states of consciousness, to
recall those mental images, to discuss them with other people within an
accepted framework (that is, to socialize), and to make pictures.’14 The
variable factors pertain to cultural context and to the values attached to
those various kinds of experience.
Unlike Mithen and the aestheticians, Lewis-Williams emphasises the
full spectrum of consciousness, from being fully alert to day-dreaming,
to hypnagogic states, to dreaming or hallucinations. Across and through
history, different cultures have assigned different values to these various
mental states. Historians of religion are familiar with such things as
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visions. More significantly, ethnographers have recognised for a long
time to role of hallucinogenic states in hunter-gatherer societies and the
special role in them of the shaman. Noticing the co-presence of entopic
images with naturalistic forms in South African and North American
rock art, and a similar co-presence of previously unidentified ‘abstract’
images with naturalistic images in Upper Palaeolithic cave art, Lewis-
Williams suggested a shamanic explanation of this phenomenon. He
doesn’t suggest that cave artists painted the images that they did while
they were experiencing hallucinations, but that they produced the
paintings to recreate the hallucinatory experiences.
It would take much more time than I have been allowed to discuss
Lewis-Williams supporting evidence but a significant part of his argu-
ment revolves around the material conditions of the imagery’s creation
and use. Although we are used to seeing works of art as photographs on
a page, before the invention of photography people didn’t see them in
under those conditions. Before the invention of museums, spectators
saw works of art in situ, installed in a variety of settings. And before
people started collecting religious images, they were used for site spe-
cific purposes in churches, cathedrals and so on. In those kinds of
contexts they were worshipped, touched, kissed and even eaten. As for
cave art, it was obviously produced in different sites in caves. Some
locations involved dangerous travel into their very depths. We know
from ethnographic study of hunter-gatherer societies that the shamanic
visions involve the three spheres of the sky, the land and the depths of
the earth. We also know that they retreated into barely accessible places
to experience their visions, induced by fasting, drugs, or sensual
deprivation.The interesting feature of cave art is that it can make use of
physical projections in its creation: it is almost as if the animals are
emerging from the walls of the caves in which they have been depicted.
They are not grounded in illusory spatial contexts, but are grounded in
the walls themselves. They are not depictions but what Gombrich has
called simulacra: the hobby-horse is not a depiction or a representation
of a horse but it is a horse itself.The entopic imagery to be found in the
caves is not so much images of entopic sights so much as simulacra of
entopic experiences.
The question remains, did the artists and spectators of the Upper
Palaeolithic period experience their cave paintings aesthetically? I believe
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that Sibley was right to think that that the ‘qualities and appearances that
can be admired aesthetically for themselves must be ones which some-
how, putting aesthetic questions aside, are vitally involved in human
experience.’ 15
In a paper that I’ll be presenting to a philosophy round-table in
Adelaide in a week’s time, I will be arguing that the time has come to
move on from endless debates about pictorial representation and ask the
more fundamental question: what were pictures for? What were their
tasks? And the answers should lead back into the heart of aesthetics.
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